





This paper summarizes regulation in the rail industry
in Japan and the current deregulation situation since
1987.One important turning point in Japanese railway
regulation policy was the privatization of the Japan
National Railway (JNR) and its subdivision into 6 pas-
senger JR companies and 1 nationwide freight JR
company (see details in, for example, Mizutani and
Nakamura 2004). In 1987, the Railway Business Law
was enacted to regulate all kinds of rail organizations,
and a decade later,in 1997,the ceiling price regulation
was introduced. Although a yardstick competition
scheme (or yardstick regulation) had been used for
the assessment of 15 large private railways,a more sys-
tematic yardstick competition scheme was developed
and expanded to apply to 6 JR companies and 10 pub-
lic subway systems.In 2000,entry into the industry and
pricing were largely deregulated.First,as for the entry
regulation,the license system for entry was changed to
a permission system. Second, whereas the demand-
supply balance had been an important criterion in the
regulation of entrance into the railway market, that
criterion was abandoned.As for price deregulation, it
became permissible for a rail operator to change rail
fare freely simply by reporting changes to the regula-
tor, as long as the fare change kept the price lower
than the ceiling price.
Based on the structure of the regulation scheme
mentioned above, I will explain several important
points regarding regulation in the Japanese rail in-
dustry.The structure of this paper is as follows. First,
I will explain the organization of the Japanese rail in-
dustry, focusing on the ownership type and the kind
of railways. Second, I will summarize railway regula-
tion, focusing on entry and exit regulation, fare reg-
ulation, track fee regulation and so on. Third, I will
explain the competition situation, considering the
competition for the market and in the market. Last,
the yardstick competition scheme, an important char-
acteristic of the Japanese approach to regulation, will
be explained.
Organization of the Japanese rail industry
According to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure
and Transport, there were 199 organizations defined
as rail operators, as of 1 October 2003 (Ministry of
Land, Infrastructure and Transport 2003). Of these
operators, heavy and light rail operators account for
163 operators, and the remaining 36 operators are
comprised of monorails, automated guideway tran-
sit, cable cars and such.
Passenger rails in Japan are still very important and
the share of rail transportation was 27 percent in
terms of passenger-kilometers in 2000.On the other
hand, the share of freight rail transportation was
only 3.8 percent in terms of ton-kilometers in 2000.
There are 150 passenger rail operations, but freight
rail organizations account for only 13.
Based on Mizutani (1999), we can classify passenger
rail operators in four ways: their legal classification,
ownership, transport type and main service areas.
There are three forms of legal classification in Japan:
private corporations,special corporations and public
organizations. Private corporations refer to organi-
zations legally considered to be private companies.
Private corporations are not always identical to fully
privately owned organizations. Therefore, these or-
ganizations include companies for which part of the
shares are held by the public sector.A public organi-
zation is usually a department of the government.
These often are the departments of transportation of
a local government, for example the Bureau of Trans-
portation in the city of Kobe.A special corporation is
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an organization which is settled and regulated by spe-
cial law (Uekusa 1991). For example, JRs which were
established by the privatization of the Japan National
Railway are considered special corporations because
JRs are still controlled by the special JR law.
Second, as for ownership, there are three categories:
private, public and private-public joint ownership.
Most Japanese rail operators are privately owned.
For example, 15 large private railways such as Tokyu
and Seibu in Tokyo and Hankyu and Kintetsu in
Osaka, which are widely considered the most effi-
cient railway organizations, are all privately owned
railway companies. Public ownership is limited to
only 11 operators. Of these 11 publicly owned oper-
ators, 9 operators are subway systems such as Tokyo,
Osaka and Nagoya.Although three JR companies –
JR East, JR Central and JR West – have recently
been fully privatized, the other four JRs have not
been fully privatized, with most of their shares still
being held by the government. Private-public jointly
owned organizations comprise what is often called
the third sector in Japan.These private-public joint-
ly owned organizations are most often found in small
communities.
The most common type of transportation in Japan is
urban railways in large metropolitan areas, with the
major 15 private railways being classified in this cat-
egory. However, JRs have both urban and intercity
rail services. The most famous bullet intercity rail,
the Shinkansen system,is operated by JR companies.
Regulation
General regulations
The railway industry is highly regulated, just as oth-
er public utility industries,such as electricity,gas and
water supply, are highly regulated. The Railway
Business Law (Tetsudo Jigyoho) has applied to all
rail companies since 1 April 1987, when the privati-
zation of JNR was enacted.Before 1987,regulations
for JNR differed from those for other railways:JNR
was regulated by the Japan National Railway Law
(Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudoho) and other railways,such
as private railways and public subway systems, were
regulated by the Local Railway Law (Chiho Tet-
sudoho). In addition to the Railway Business Law,
there are over 150 laws directed at the industry and
enforced by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure
and Transport.
Entry and exit regulations
With the revision of the Railway Business Law in
2000, it was no longer necessary to acquire a rail li-
cense before entering the rail market. According to
the Railway Business Law (Article 3), if some orga-
nization is deemed qualified by the Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure and Transport, then the organization
can commence rail services.The regulatory change in
2000, therefore, was from a license system to a per-
mission system.
Although the license system has been out of use
since 2000,the rail business in Japan is classified into
three categories based on the Railway Business Law
(Article 2):
1) Class 1: enterprises that provide rail passenger and/
or freight services while holding their own rail in-
frastructure;
2) Class 2:enterprises that provide rail passenger and/
or freight services using rail infrastructure owned
by another organization;
3) Class 3: enterprises that build rail infrastructure
for sale to a class 1 enterprise, or an enterprise
which owns infrastructure and rents it to a class 2
enterprise.
While in the European Union rail industry vertical
(operation-infrastructure) separation is a common
policy, in Japan vertical integration is the norm, with
most railway organizations being class 1 enterprises.
For example, JR companies such as JR East and JR
West, large private railways such as Tokyu and Kin-
tetsu, public subway systems such as Osaka’s and
Nagoya’s, are all class 1 enterprises.
On the other hand,there are few class 2 and class 3 en-
terprises in Japan. A typical example of a class 2 en-
terprise is JR Freight. Since privatization, JR Freight
has provided rail services by using the rail tracks
owned by the six JR passenger companies. As for a
class 3 enterprise, Kobe rapid transit railway (Kobe
Kosoku) is an example. Although details regarding
this organization can be found in Mizutani and Shoji
(2004), this company owns rail track and rents it to
four private operators, which are class 2 enterprises.
It is worth noting that it is possible for each rail or-
ganization to be classified into more than one cate-
gory. For example, a private railway might have two
kinds of rail classes (class 1 and class 2).Although in
the case of its Kobe Kosoku line,the Hankyu railway
organization is considered a class 2 enterprise be-cause this line’s tracks are owned by the Kobe
Kosoku company, for most of its network Hankyu is
a class 1 enterprise because it owns most of the rail
tracks on which its trains operate.
Criteria for obtaining permission to operate a rail
business are described in the Railway Business Law
(Article 5).The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and
Transport gives a rail operator permission to provide
rail services, if the following four criteria are met:
1) The plan is sound from a business point of view;
2) The plan is adequate from a safety point of view;
3) There are adequate operational plans in addition
to the whole plan;
4) A potential entrant takes on financial and tech-
nological liability.
There are two main new points introduced by the en-
try regulation of 2000.First,as mentioned before,the
license system became the permission system. Al-
though these two systems seem similar,the basic pol-
icy has changed. The philosophy of the license sys-
tem for the rail business was that entry to the market
should be prohibited or limited to a very few com-
panies. In contrast, the permission system theoreti-
cally grants potential entrance to any organization.
Second, controlling the balance between supply and
demand was abolished as an entry criterion in 2000.
Before 2000, two criteria related to this item were
written in the old Railway Business Law:
1) It must be determined that demand for railway
service is sufficient;
2) There should be no imbalance between supply
and demand for rail service when a potential en-
trant enters the market.
Since the old Railway Business Law was enacted in
1987, there has been some criticism of the criteria,
particularly of the supply-demand controlling regu-
lation, which provided no description of the specific
conditions necessary to obtain a rail license, such as
the minimum demand level and the degree of de-
mand-supply imbalance. The vague and unclear cri-
teria often overprotected incumbent operators.
These criteria were abolished because of their effect
in deterring competition.
There is no limit to the duration of the permission.
Once a rail operator is allowed to operate the rail
service, then it is fully responsible for providing rail
services, except in cases in which permission is can-
celled due to negligence and when the operator exits.
Exit regulations were also lightened after deregula-
tion.The new regulation requires only notification to
the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport
one year ahead of terminating the rail services based
on the Railway Business Law (Article 28.1).The old
regulation required approval from the Ministry of
Transport in order for an operator to cease supplying
service. This law stipulated that the exit of rail ser-
vice providers would be allowed if such closure did
not damage public interest. This vague description
seemed to allow an easy exit for railway service pro-
viders, but in fact it was very difficult for railways to
go out of business (Saito 1993).
Fare regulations
The full cost principle is generally applied in the rail
industry in Japan. The current regulatory reform in
the railway industry has resulted in the introduction
of a ceiling price system and a new yardstick compe-
tition scheme following the full cost principle which
is applied to passenger rail fare (Okabe 2004).
There are five important points regarding fare regula-
tion based on the Railway Business Law (Article 16).
First,the ceiling price of rail fare must be approved by
the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport.
Second, as mentioned before, because the Japanese
railway industry is based upon the full cost principle,
the rail fare should cover rail costs including the op-
erator’s profits. Generally rail operators are expected
not to receive subsidies. Third, as for changes in rail
fare, if the rail fare is within the ceiling price, the op-
erator needs only to report the change to the Ministry.
Fourth, operators need only to report to the Ministry,
when the operators set up new rail fares, such as for
express service. Last, if the rail fare increase can be
shown to discriminate against some group and/or the
fare causes unfair competition with other railways,the
Ministry can order the fare to be revised.
The actual application of the ceiling price of the rail
fare began in 1997 but was not introduced as a regu-
lation until 2000. Therefore, since 2000, changes in
rail fares within the ceiling have become easier be-
cause rail operators need not obtain approval from
the Ministry.
Rail track fee regulations
In Japan, there are few rail infrastructure providers
(class 3 organizations), so that regulations regarding
rail track fees are rather general. For example, the
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Rail Business Law (Article 15) rules only that class 1
or class 3 organizations must receive approval of their
rail track fees from the Ministry of Land, Infrastruc-
ture and Transport. The law does not regulate how
much the rail operator pays to the track holding or-
ganization, but does require that track fees and con-
ditions of usage be approved by the Ministry.
There are no specific criteria for the assessment of rail
track fees. The Enforcement Regulation of the Rail-
way Business Law (Tetsudo Jigyo Shiko Kisoku,Arti-
cle 30), however, requires the provider to submit doc-
uments to be evaluated by the Ministry of Land,Infra-
structure and Transport, detailing how the rail track
fee is calculated.
There is no single method for establishing rail track
fees in Japan. As for JR Freight, the avoidable cost
principle is used. But in general, because rail track
fees are set up to cover the provider’s cost, the Min-
istry of Land Infrastructure and Transport will con-
sider whether or not the cost is reasonable.
Other regulations
In Japan private railway operators play a vital role.
Therefore, service characteristics and non-rail ser-
vices are important for private rail operators. First,
although service characteristics are regulated by the
Railway Commercial Law (Tetsudo Eigyoho) and the
Regulation for Railway Transport (Tetsudo Unyu
Kisoku), the descriptions in these codes are very gen-
eral. Generally, more concrete rail operation matters
such as train schedules can be determined by a rail-
way operator.
Second, Japanese private railways have long been al-
lowed to operate non-rail business as well as rail busi-
ness. Many private rail companies operate real estate
development, retail ventures such as department
stores, and other transportation business such as bus
and taxi services. However, railway business and non-
rail business are strictly separated by Railway Ac-
counting Regulations (Tetsudo Kaikei Kisoku).A rail-
way company is forbidden to allocate rail and non-rail
cost at its own discretion, but must follow regulations
which describe in detail how to allocate the costs of
common facilities and administration. Therefore, it is
possible to capture an externality,such as the effect of
housing development along rail lines, but an inten-
tional cross-subsidy strategy is avoided,whereby a rail
company charges high rail fares and transfers costs
from the non-rail service, and vice versa.
Competition for the market and in the market
Although the license system changed to the permis-
sion system for the entry regulation in 2000, there
seems to be almost no competition for the rail market
because the duration of the effective term of the per-
mission is not stipulated. The system seems based on
the concept of traditional monopoly regulation.When
the authority gives permission, the authority gives
monopolistic rail service to a railway operator while
regulating rail fare and service standards to protect
rail users from the hazards of a real monopoly. Be-
cause the Railway Business Law rules that the trans-
portation committee appointed by the Ministry of
Land, Infrastructure and Transport should hear the
opinions from the related railway companies and per-
sons when the new railway plan is being considered,
there is almost no direct competition for the market.
There are advantages and disadvantages to this sys-
tem.The advantage of this system is that a rail opera-
tor can concentrate on providing better services in the
long run,because it protects incumbent rail enterpris-
es from potential entrants as long as incumbents’ ser-
vices are not terribly bad.Although there is no direct
competition with potential rail entrants, there is al-
ways competition with other transportation modes
such as the private automobile. Furthermore, as pri-
vate railway companies develop areas along rail lines
and stations by building housing and operating de-
partment stores, they have incentives to provide bet-
ter services to attract potential rail passengers.
On the other hand, the efficiency of incumbent rail
operators may suffer due to a less competitive situa-
tion. Rail operators in large metropolitan areas
might become particularly complacent because com-
muter services to large central cities from suburbs
are dominated by rail transportation. In order to
avoid the inefficiency due to a monopolistic situa-
tion, a yardstick competition scheme has been intro-
duced which will be discussed later in this article.
There is almost no competition in the market, which
would mean several rail operators competing along
the same track. As explained earlier, most rail opera-
tors are class 1 operators providing rail services along
their own tracks. Of course, there are cases in which a
rail company runs trains on a different rail company’s
tracks. However, most of these are due to the cooper-
ation of two organizations whose best interest is to
provide more convenient services for rail users,such as
direct train services from suburb-to-suburb through
central cities.Yardstick competition
One important point about the Japanese rail indus-
try is that the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and
Transport uses a yardstick competition scheme to in-
crease efficiency among existing railway companies.
Yardstick competition is seen as competition among
rail operators operating in different markets. In this
scheme,a regulator sets up several performance meas-
ures such as operating cost and evaluates rail opera-
tors’ performance.
In Japan this scheme has been applied to fare revi-
sion in 15 large private railways since 1970s. For ex-
ample,if a rail operator is inferior to other operators,
then as a penalty the Ministry does not approve the
fare level desired by the operator.On the other hand,
if an operator’s performance is better than that of
others, then the fare level is approved without revi-
sion. Thus any monopolistic behavior due to the li-
censing system can be counterbalanced to some de-
gree by this scheme.
However,there are two issues to consider with respect
to yardstick competition. The first is the question of
how effective the yardstick competition scheme is.
Although the scheme does not bring about a situation
of perfect competition, some kind of competition
seems to exist.In fact,Mizutani’s (1997) results,based
upon Japanese railways’ data set, have shown that
yardstick competition among large private railways
works to some degree. The second issue is related to
the number of rail operators involved. The yardstick
competition scheme had not been applied to public
railways and small private railways until 1997, when
the Ministry of Land,Infrastructure and Transport re-
vised the scheme into a more sophisticated tool, mak-
ing it possible to apply the scheme to three different
groups: 15 large private railways, 6 passenger JRs and
10 public subway systems (Okabe 1997, 2004).
In yardstick competition schemes, five measures re-
lated to operating cost are used: 1) track costs, 2)
catenary costs, 3) rolling stock costs, 4) train operat-
ing costs, 5) station operating costs. The standard
costs for these five measures are obtained by the fol-
lowing procedure.First,by using data set of each rail-
way,the unit cost for five costs are obtained.The unit
cost is defined as the cost divided by appropriate
numbers of facilities (e.g. the track cost per track
length,the station costs per station).Second,by using
these five unit costs as dependent variables, regres-
sion analysis is applied. Several variables related to
each cost such as train-kilometers per route-kilome-
ters and numbers of passengers per station are used
as explanatory variables. Third, by substituting each
rail company’s value of explanatory variable into the
regression result, the standard unit cost of each rail
company is calculated. Next, by multiplying the stan-
dard unit cost by each rail company’s number of fa-
cilities,the standard cost of each category is obtained.
Finally,by comparing the actual cost of each rail com-
pany with the standard cost of each rail company,the
performance of each rail company is evaluated.
The yardstick competition scheme uses an incentive
system for rail operators.For the less efficient rail oper-
ator, whose actual costs are higher than the standard
costs, the reasonable costs for the fare level are the
same as the standard costs.Therefore, in the next peri-
od, the rail operator is expected to reduce the actual
costs to the level of the standard costs. On the other
hand, for the more efficient rail operator, whose actual
costs are lower than the standard costs,reasonable costs
for the fare level are set at half the sum of the actual
costs and the standard costs. Therefore, half of the dif-
ference between the actual costs and the standard costs
is awarded to the efficient rail operator as a reward.
Concluding remarks
The following are characteristics of the Japanese rail
industry:
1) Railways are privately owned except for nine
public subway systems;
2) Operation-infrastructure connection is vertically
integrated;
3) Entry regulation is based on a permission system;
4) Price is calculated by the full cost principle includ-
ing capital costs;
5) Price regulations are based on an approval system
for the ceiling price and a reporting system with-
in the ceiling price;
6) There is almost no competition for the market;
7) There is almost no competition in the market for
sharing tracks;
8) A yardstick competition scheme is applied for
three railway groups (large private, JRs and sub-
way systems).
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